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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE P. MARTIN, 
Plaintiff and Ap·pellant, 
-vs.-
RALPH L. JONES, dba MOUNT 
AIR PHARMACY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 77 6'6 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF· IN ANSWER 
TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
. CASES CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S DE-
CISION DISTINGUISHED. 
In his answer to respondent's petition for a rehear-
ing, appellant has cited a number of decisions, which it is 
claimed support the majority opinion in this case. Those 
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dPeisions involve different facts than the situation out of 
which this case arose; for example, in some of the cases 
cited, the injured person was a child a~d therefore not 
' ' <~apable of exercising the same degree of care to avoid 
injury to himself as an adult, or to even realize he was 
a trespasser. Of course, under those circumstances the 
owner has a duty to warn the child of a dangerous condi-
tion on the premises upon becoming aware of his pres-
ence thereon or having sufficient reason to expect the 
child to be upon the premises in close proximity to said 
danger. This, in Blaycock v. Goates, et al, 44 Cal. App. 2d 
850, 113 P2 256, cited on Page 4 of appellant's brief, the 
suit involved injuries to a 13-year old girl. In McPheters 
v. Loo1nis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 Atl. 2 437, cited on Page 7 
of ap·pellant's br~ef, the suit was for damages resulting 
from the death of a 9-year old boy. 
Where the person injured is an adult, whom the 
owner could reasonably assume knew he is a trespasser 
and consequently under a duty to be more alert for dan-
ger of injury to himself from conditions or activities 
on the premises, the duty of the owner to warn the tres-
passer is much less or, dep~nding upon the circumstances, 
may not exist. 
In the case of Euclid 105th Street's Property Corn-
pany v. Backman, 42 NE 2nd 789, cited on Page 5 of appel-
lant's brief, the injured party was a tenant who fell 
through a sky light which had been covered with tar paper 
to resemble the rest of the roof. The employees of the 
apartment house had frequently seen the plaintiff and 
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others \vashing \vind0\\'8 fron1 th~ roof where the tt~tutnt 
was standing 'vhen she fell. Under such cireuHl~buH·ps 
it could logically be n1aintained that the plaintiff had an 
irnplied invitation to be "~here she \vas, certainly not the 
situation at the :Jiount .. :\..ir Pharmacy \vhen this aeeident 
occurred. 
There is no evidence that the defendant owner or his 
employees had reason to anticipate that plaintiff would 
go be}~ond the colmter in proximity to the shaft opening. 
True: ~Irs. Cannon, an employee, saw him there. She 
did not warn him of the nearness of the opening. The 
light was more than sufficient for him to see the shaft. 
To get to the place where he reached for the pencils, it 
was necessary for him to walk directly towards its loca-
tion, which was at the extreme west end of the area be-
hind the counter, and to get behind the counter, it was 
necessary for him to walk past the sign reading "No J\d-
Inission-Employees Only". Under such circumstances, 
we submit that Mrs. Cannon was under no duty as a matter 
of law to warn the plaintiff of the condition which was as 
apparent to him as to her and, further, she was entitled 
to assume that the plaintiff had not only observed the 
opening but had also seen the sign which in itself con-
stituted a warning of the probability of the existence 
of a dangerous condition in the restricted area. This 
principle is set out in Paragraph 2 under Section 336 of 
the Restatement of the Law of Torts, as follows: 
"2. The trespasser having no privilege to 
enter the premises must realize that he should be 
on the alert to observe not only the condition of 
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the land but alRo the possessor's activities thereon. 
The possessor is therefore often entitled to assume 
that a trespasser will realize his danger under 
conditions in which no such assumption would he 
permissible if a similar situation occurred in a 
public place or if the trespasser were a licensee." 
We have no quarrel with the Rule of law that requires an 
owner to warn a trespasser of a dangerous condition 
when the owner under the circumstances should reasonr-
ably know that the trespasser is unaware of the said dan-
gerous condition and is thereby likely to be injured. In 
some situations, the circumstances may he such as to be 
tantamount to actual knowledge on the part of the owner. 
The decision of this court adopting Section 337 of the Re-
statement of Torts extends the doctrine to the extent that 
the owner or possessor of premises becomes in effect an 
insurer of the safety of all persons coming upon his land, 
including trespassers, even though such persons are in-
jured by an artificial condition which the owner is law-
fully maintaining. The decision in this case obviates 
entirely the distinction between the duty an owner has 
towards an invitee upon the premises and the duty that 
an ower has towards a trespasser. There would be very 
few instances where a jury could not find that the owner 
"ought to have known that such a trespasser is near the 
danger", or "had reason to believe the trespasser would 
not discover the danger", particularly if the injury were 
sufficiently serious to invoke sympathy. Heretofore, 
this court has always refused to apply such a rule. 
In the case of Bogden v. L. A. & 8. L .R .. R. C~m-
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pa.n.y, 59 Utah 505, :205 P. 571, a boy went upon a railroad 
right of 'va.y looking for sheep and while there collected 
powder from the floor of a railroad car, which he ex-
ploded causing severe burns to himself. Justice Frick of 
this Court held there was no liability on the part of the 
defendant and said: 
·'vVhile the accident was an unfortunate one, 
yet it \vas one which the defendant could not have 
foreseen, and therefore cannot legally be held li-
able for. In the conduct of rnodern business enter-
prises, accidents will, and of necessity must, hap-
pen. The la,Y, .ho,vever, does not impose liability 
·lmless the party charged with negligence could by 
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have 
prevented the accident. Although children of ten-
. der years are favored by the law, yet, even before 
one of thern can recover for an injury, it must 
appear that the p·erson causing the injury owed a 
duty to the injured child, and that he negligently 
failed to discharge that duty by failing to exer-
cise that degree of care that the law imposed un-
der the circumstances. It goes without saying 
that one cannot discharge a duty before it is 
lmo,vn to exist, and while actual knowledge of its 
existence is not always necessary, yet the facts 
must be such that knowledge may be imputed upon 
the ground that the person charged by the exer-
cise of reasonable care ought to have known, and 
hence, in contemplation of law, did know." 
And in the case of Smalley v. Rio Gr(JJYI)de Western 
Ry. Co., 34 U. 4:23, 98 P. 311, where a minor child came 
upon the defendant's railroad yard and was injured 
while climbing on one of the cars which was being moved 
hy the defendant, the Court said: 
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"That is, before negligence can he predicated 
on a failure to observe a reasonable lookout or in 
the manner in which the cars were operated or 
managed about the yard, it must be held that a 
duty to use care in such particular was owing 
from the defendant to the plaintiff. F·or every case 
of actionable negligence involves a duty to use 
care and a breach of such duty resulting in injury.· 
Whether in a given case a duty to use care was 
imposed on a party charged with negligence is 
ordinarily a question of law. A railroad company, 
as a matter of law, owes a duty to those who are 
rightfully about its premises, or who are there 
with its express or implied permission or invita-
tion, to use care. It ordinarily owes no such duty 
to one who is wrongfully about its premises. The 
employees of the defendant' were under no duty to 
use care in the handling of the cars about the 
yard in anticipation of wholly unauthorized in-
trusions of others. As to such persons, no duty 
to use care arose, until their presence was dis-
covered .... Where the public or the people of a 
neighborhood, though technically unauthorized, 
have for a considerable length of time generally 
or habitua1ly traversed railroad premises without 
objection, there is much reason for holding that 
the employees of the railroad company are re-
quired to take notice of such facts and to regulate 
their conduct accordingly. But the evidence does 
not show that kind of a case or any case where 
the unauthorized or uninvited presence of any one 
1vas acquiesced in or permitted without objection." 
The general rule is as stated in Brown v. Salt Lake 
City, 33 Utah 222; 93 P. 570, on Page 238, wherein the 
court said: 
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HAs against In ere· intruders or licensees, the 
owner need not maintain his pre1nises in a reason-
ably safe condition but as to those who come upon 
then1 by invitation, express or ilnplied, he o'\ves the 
duty of reasonable care for their safety; that is 
the general rule and to depart from it in favor of 
adult persons would cast a burden upon the owner-
ship in do1ninion of private property, which would 
be intolerable." 
The opinion then distinguishes a situation where.a 
child of tender years is on the premises because of an 
attractive nuisance. The rule announced by the cases 
setting out the duty of an owner towards a trespasser 
is overruled by the decision in this case as effectively as 
if the opinion had specifically held that a landowner 
owes the same duty to a trespasser as to an invitee; that 
is, to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition 
for anyone who enters, whether privileged to do so or 
not. See also Bird v. Cloverleaf Harris Dairy, 102 1Jtah 
330, 125 P. 2d 797, wherein Justice Wolfe says: 
"The owner was under no duty to keep his 
property safe for trespassers or rnere licensees." 
C'ONTRIBUTORY NE·GLIGE.NCE 
In his opinion Chief Justice Wolfe attempts to dis-
tinguish between the facts of the case and the facts in 
the case of Knox v. Snow (Utah), 229 P2 874. In this sit-
uation - true - there were no obstacles in plaintiff's 
path as he approached the opening comparable to those 
in the service station premises in Knox v. Snow; how-
ever, the narrowness of the aisle behind the counter re-
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quired the plaintiff to walk directly toward the opening 
to get to a place where he could reach the pencils and of 
necessity would compel him to observe the floor area 
where the opening was located. Also, there was a raised 
border around the hole four inches wide and one inch 
high. 'The evidence was undisputed the the floor was well 
lighted. We agree that in the majority of cases where a 
person is injured by stepping or falling into a hole or de-
fect in the floor, that the question of contributory negli-
gence in failing to keep a proper lookout is an issue for 
the jury. However, the court has overlooked the distinc-
tion that the plaintiff in this case was a mature man, 46 
years of age and indisputably a trespasser. He had a 
greater duty to be more alert for his safety and to see 
this hole than would an invitee or a child. There was no 
reason for him to assume that the proprietor would use 
reasonable care to keep the area behind the counter safe 
for his use. His testimony is quoted ver ba.tim, (Record 
63): 
"Q. You had been in the Mount Air Pharmacy a 
a number of times before November 11th-
the day of this accident~ 
A. A number of times, yes. 
Q. And on any of those prior occasions, had you 
ever been behind the liquor counter~ 
A. Never been behind it, no. 
Q. Had you ever seen any other patrons behind 
that counter or any one other than the per-
sons who were working there~ 
A. I don't remember seeing anyone. 
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Q. There 'Yere other places in the store where 
patrons did nor ordinarily go, were there 
not! 
~\.. Yes. 
Q. You had never been behind the column to the 
east of the liquor counter J? 
A. No." 
In the course of the argument before this court on 
rehearing, Justice Wolfe commented that evolution had 
taken place in the law since the time when a landowner 
could set a spring-gun trap for trespassers. No one would 
disagree or contend that such evolution was not bene-
ficial to society. However, we respectfully submit that 
an analogy between a spring gun and the hole in this 
case is not justified in any degree. The former would 
constitute an intentional injury and make the status of 
a trespasser an outlaw. Under our system of law, the 
possessor of 1and has had a legally protected interest in 
the exclusiveness of his possession. Persons who intrude 
without his permission have had no right to demand that 
he provide them with a safe place to trespass or that he 
protect them in the wronful use of his property. It seems 
only just that an adult persons who knows that he is on 
a place on the premises where he has no right or invita-
tion to be (the jury by its verdict impliedly found that the 
plaintiff had seen the sign "No Admittance - Employ-
ees Only") assumed the risk of injury to himself from a 
condition lawfully maintained on the premises. 
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c·oN·CL USION 
It is respectfully submitted that the majority decisions 
heretofore rendered by this court should be disaffirmed 
and the verdict of the jury permitted to stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S:TEW AR'T, CANNON & HANSON 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
REX J. HANSON 
DoN J. HANSON 
ERNEST F'. BALDWIN, JR. 
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